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Abstract 
 
During the past decades, the worldwide spread of the human immuno-deficiency virus 
(HIV) has created one of the deadliest epidemics in human history. Despite widely 
available bio-medical knowledge about how to prevent transmission of the virus, and 
technologies and resources to treat people living with HIV/AIDS, the disease 
continues to spread, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa. However, despite the 
general precarious situation in sub-Saharan Africa, there is in fact great variation 
among African states as regards HIV prevalence. This paper builds a framework for 
increasing our understanding of the sources of this variation. More specifically, we 
argue that HIV/AIDS is a different kind of problem than other diseases in the sense 
that effective prevention demands sacrifices on the behalf of individuals that are 
costly in both material and non-material terms. The failure to recognize these costs 
makes standard solutions, such as for example increased access to medication, 
expanded funds, and health sector reforms, potentially ineffective. With the point of 
departure in the costs and individual sacrifices demanded for the successful 
combating of HIV/AIDS, this paper suggests that future research on HIV/AIDS would 
benefit from exploring the impact of varying institutional arrangements such as for 
example the degree to which state power is centralized or decentralized on HIV/AIDS 
outcomes. Institutions have commonly been argued to shape and constrain individual 
behavior. Yet, their impact on sexual behavior and behavior change remains largely 
unexplored. 
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Overall objective 
During the past decades, the worldwide spread of the human immuno-deficiency 
virus (HIV) has created one of the deadliest epidemics in human history. Despite 
widely available bio-medical knowledge about how to prevent transmission of the 
virus, and technologies and resources to treat people living with HIV/AIDS, the 
disease continues to spread, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Why so many 
deaths? Why is it that people continue to engage in sexual behavior that could 
lead to a slow and painful premature death? 
In this paper, we argue that while previous research has provided a large 
number of important insights, they generally lack a deeper understanding of what 
kind of problem HIV/AIDS is. Accordingly, previous research has by and large 
treated HIV/AIDS as a disease among others. This becomes evident in the UN 
Millennium Development Goal number six, concerned with how to halt and begin 
to reverse the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and other diseases before 2015. 
In the same vein, one of the financially strongest actors in the field, The Global 
Fund, lumps together AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis. While global initiatives to 
fight the disease is of course a good thing, in this paper we argue that, since 
HIV/AIDS is a different kind of problem than other diseases, there is a risk that 
standard solutions, such as for example increased access to medication, expanded 
funds, and health sector reforms, will only have limited impact. We argue that this 
lack of understanding of which kind of problem HIV/AIDS in fact is risks 
hampering progress in terms of the effective combating of the disease. The overall 
objective of this paper is to develop this argument further. In addition, we specify 
the implications of this argument. The paper is organized as follows. In the first 
section, we discuss the spread of HIV/AIDS. While HIV/AIDS continues to 
spread rapidly in many countries, other countries have been more successful in 
terms of stopping the spread of the disease. In the second section, we further 
explore theoretical and empirical approaches within the field. While many 
previous studies have provided important contributions to the field, in general 
they are limited in their capacity to explain cross-country variation. Recognizing 
the limitations of earlier approaches, in the third section, we offer a different 
conceptualization of HIV/AIDS which has the potential to contribute further to 
our understanding of why the disease continues to spread in some countries, but 
not in others. More specifically, we argue that HIV/AIDS outcomes depend on the 
willingness among the population to make behavior changes that are often costly 
both in material and non-material terms. Furthermore, we argue that the 
willingness to make the kind of sacrifices that behavior changes imply depends on 
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individual perceptions of the legitimacy of information and preventive care. 
Accordingly, if we want to increase our understanding of why some states are 
more successful than others in their attempts to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS, the 
remaining question is why some states have more currency as regards legitimacy 
of information and preventive care than others. We argue that political institutions 
are crucial in this regard. In section four, we propose a tentative research design. 
Finally, in section five, we provide a summary and conclusions. 
The spread of HIV/AIDS 
The spread of HIV/AIDS now presents a major social and economic crisis in 
much of the developing world, as well as a public policy crisis of virtually 
unprecedented proportions. A total of 39.5 million people were living with HIV in 
2006 (2.6 million more than in 2004). The number of new infections in 2006 rose 
to 4.3 million (400 000 more than in 2004). Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly the 
most affected area of the world with more than twenty-four million people 
estimated to be infected with HIV in 2006 (UNAIDS 2007). Being home to 
merely 10 percent of the global population, sub-Saharan Africa is also home to a 
total of 64 percent of the HIV-positive people in the world (UN 2006). In 2005, 
AIDS killed 2.8 million people in Africa, making the disease even more lethal 
than wars that year (Patterson 2006). Life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa, 
which had risen by fifteen years in the early 1990s, was projected to drop to forty-
five years by the end of the decade. In the most severely affected countries, 
infection rates are above twenty-five percent of the population.  
In addition to leading to great human suffering, increased morbidity and 
mortality have important consequences for political and economic development. 
On the micro level, negative economic implications of having family members 
that are infected by HIV have been documented in many parts of the world. 
Negative economic implications range from increased medical costs and 
expenditures on funerals to withdrawal of family members from work or school to 
look after those who are ill (UNAIDS 2006). The illness of a household 
breadwinner has the potential to undermine a poor household’s ability to cope 
financially (Claeson et al. 2002). Widows and elderly women often lack financial, 
legal and moral support when, as the sole adult within the family, they take on 
responsibility for the care of children and young people (Sida 2003).  
On the macro level, widespread illness among a population undermines the 
prospects for poverty reduction, as well as for economic and social development 
in general. As a consequence, health is increasingly seen as one of the key 
ultimate goals of development, and as a dimension of poverty in its own right. The 
 4
loss of civil servants, with their training, expertise, and networks of personal 
contacts, hampers the state’s ability to provide services, including AIDS 
prevention and treatment programs (de Waal 2003). Over the last couple of 
decades, the demand for health services, including drugs, has risen as more people 
develop HIV/AIDS. The capacity of the health care system to cope has, however, 
been gradually diminished by the loss of staff through AIDS-related deaths, and 
increased costs may arise from the introduction of new safety procedures (Sida 
2003). Along with health sector workers, among civil servants, especially teachers 
stand out as one of the groups most severely affected by the virus. For example, in 
2006 it was estimated that as many as 21 percent of the teachers in South Africa 
were living with HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2006).  
The inability of governments to respond to societal problems in addition has 
the potential to increase citizen discontent and divisions within government. On a 
continent where many countries have weak state institutions, these demands may 
contribute to political instability. In fact, a large and growing literature, relates the 
spread of HIV/AIDS not only to national but to global insecurity. For example, 
Chow (1996) argues that an intimate relationship exists between disease, conflict 
and instability that can threaten the national security interest of the United States. 
According to Chow’s argument, political instability and disease reinforce one 
another. Military deployments spread HIV/AIDS and HIV/AIDS in turn places 
strains on government resources. Lack of government resources, in turn, leads to 
political dissatisfaction and potential instability which makes further military 
deployments necessary; the vicious circle is closed. Kelley (2000) offers a similar 
analysis, noting the Unites States’ national security is threatened by major health 
epidemics that undermine military readiness. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has also 
been addressed in relation to security issues by a large number of politicians and 
by the donor community. In a groundbreaking address to the United Nations 
Security Council in January 2000, then Vice President Al Gore declared:  
 
“Today marks the first time, after more than 4,000 meetings … that the Security 
Council will discuss a health issue as a security threat. We tend to think of a threat to 
security in terms of war and peace. Yet no one can doubt that the havoc wreaked and 
the toll exacted by HIV/AIDS do threaten security. … when a single disease threatens 
everything from economic strength to peacekeeping – we clearly face a security 
threat of the greatest magnitude.” (as cited in Bartels 2003) 
    
Following Vice President’s Gore’s address, James Wolfensohn, ex-President of 
the World Bank Group, argued forcefully that:  
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“many of us used to think of AIDS as a health issue. We were wrong. … nothing we 
have seen is a greater challenge to the peace and stability of African societies than the 
epidemic of AIDS. … in AIDS we face a war more debilitating than war itself … we 
face a major development crisis, and more than that, a security crisis. For without 
economic and social hope we will not have peace, and AIDS surely undermines 
both.” (as cited in Bartels 2003) 
 
In sum, the spread of HIV/AIDS has the potential to impact negatively on the 
development of the individual as well as of the larger community. Yet, despite 
heavy investments and a number of global initiatives – the maybe most 
comprehensive one being the UN Millennium Development Goal number six1 – 
widespread disease continues to severely hamper the prospects for economic 
development and human well-being in many developing countries. Importantly, 
however, when it comes to the prevalence of HIV, incidence of new infections, 
and annual number of AIDS-related deaths, there is in fact large variation between 
states, and even among the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, in general the most 
severely affected countries in the world (see Table 1 for prevalence rates for the 
sub-Saharan African states). That is, international recommendations, health 
interventions, and policies have actually produced quite different outcomes in 
different countries. As will be clear from the following section, previous research 
has been to slow grasp this variation. 
 
                                                     
1 Millennium Development Goal number six includes the specific target of halting and beginning to reverse the prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other major diseases before 2015.  
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Table 1. HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Percentage of adults, 15-49 years 
old infected by HIV 
 
Angola 3.9 
Benin 1.9 
Botswana 37.3 
Burkina Faso 4.2 
Burundi 6.0 
Cameroon 6.9 
Central African Republic 13.5 
Chad 4.8 
Congo 4.9 
Cote d’Ivoire 7.0 
Democratic Rep. of Congo 4.2 
Djibouti 2.9 
Eritrea 2.7 
Ethiopia 4.4 
Gabon 8.1 
Gambia 1.2 
Ghana 3.1 
Guinea 3.2 
Kenya 6.7 
Lesotho 28.9 
Liberia 5.9 
Madagascar 1.7 
Malawi 14.2 
Mali 1.9 
Mauritania 0.6 
Mozambique 12.2 
Namibia 21.3 
Niger 1.2 
Nigeria 5.4 
Rwanda 5.1 
Senegal 0.8 
South Africa 21.5 
Sudan 2.3 
Swaziland 38.8 
Tanzania 8.8 
Togo 4.1 
Uganda 4.1 
Zambia 16.5 
Zimbabwe 24.6 
 
Source: UNAIDS 2004. 
 7
Previous research 
While the literature on health sector development is quite extensive, earlier 
literature has mainly focused on the biomedical aspects of the disease, i.e. 
treatment programs and diagnosis instruments.  The limited social scientific 
research on the subject has, on the other hand, mainly focused on the 
consequences of the spread of HIV/AIDS in terms of social marginalization and 
vulnerability. There are also quite a number of studies focusing on the economic 
issues associated with widespread illness (Young 2005). Within this line of 
research, the major issues have been to account for varying cost-efficiency of 
health service delivery and the loss of productivity resulting from widespread 
illness. As such, current social scientific research is reasonably strong with respect 
to theorizing and measuring the detrimental effects of widespread illness, but less 
strong in explaining cross-country variation in the spread of the disease. However, 
a few explanations aiming at explaining cross-country differences in HIV/AIDS 
outcomes have been put forward. To start with, there are reasons to believe that 
the spread of HIV/AIDS is related to the prevalence of other diseases. If an 
individual is already infected by for example Malaria, the impaired immune 
system makes this person more likely to be infected by HIV/AIDS. The same is 
true for the reverse relationship. Nevertheless, while this explanation to why states 
vary in terms of HIV/AIDS outcomes in many ways makes sense, there is still a 
lot variation left to be explained. For example, while Malaria rates in Botswana 
and South Africa are low compared to most other African countries, HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rates are still among the highest on the African continent.  
Another commonly put forward explanation to differences in HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rates is varying state capacity. In this context state capacity refers to 
measurable skills, systems, health facilities and personnel available to the state to 
carry out its functions in terms HIV/AIDS prevention (Lieberman 2004; Swidler 
2003). However, this explanation has limitations as well. Once again, if we look 
at Botswana and South Africa, these states are among the strongest and wealthiest 
in Africa. Still, they are among the weakest when it comes to the capacity to stop 
the spread of HIV/AIDS. 
Finally, previous studies have also stressed the importance of leadership 
(Parkhurst & Lush 2004). More specifically, it has become conventional wisdom 
to attribute the policy successes of countries such as Uganda to good leadership, 
and South Africa’s stalled response to poor leadership (for a further discussion, 
see Lieberman 2004; Swidler 2003). More generally, the international HIV/AIDS 
policy community repeatedly looks to good leaders to address the issue of 
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HIV/AIDS prevention. Probably no world leader has been more rebuked for his 
statements on HIV/AIDS than the South African president Mbeki, leading many 
to conclude that it is due to his personal negligence that the South African 
response has been so weak. Mbeki has publicly questioned the link between HIV 
and AIDS. In addition, he has rarely made the problem a significant point of 
discussion in more general policy addresses. Also his health minister has 
questioned more conventional methods of combating HIV/AIDS, and instead 
emphasized the importance of good diet in order to avoid the disease. Similar to 
other researchers such as Lieberman and Gauri, while recognizing that Mbeki’s 
words and deeds certainly have had a negative influence on the prevention of 
HIV/AIDS, we still think it is problematic to attribute variation in HIV/AIDS 
prevalence only to individual leaders. Most importantly, the very assumption that 
any given leader’s whim will become effective policy must be problematized 
since the impact of leadership is in itself dependent on whether people find the 
policy trustworthy and act upon it. In this sense, it is important to ask the 
counterfactual question whether the same kind of leadership would have become 
as influential in another context. In addition, empirical facts on the ground work 
against the argument that leadership plays a decisive role. Botswana is far ahead 
most other African countries in terms of openness and commitment of its leaders 
on the HIV/AIDS issue. Still, HIV/AIDS continue to spread. 
Taken together, previous explanations have come a long way but there is still a 
lot of variation among states that is unaccounted for. In this paper, we argue that 
previous approaches lack a broader understanding of the HIV problem. The UN, 
the Global Fund, as well as other donors and policymakers by and large tend to 
treat HIV/AIDS as a disease among others. However, HIV/AIDS displays a 
number of specific characteristics. To begin with, since it is primarily a sexually 
transmitted disease that involves a large number of taboos, it is in many aspects 
quite different from most other diseases. In addition, the incubation period is 
extremely long compared to most other diseases. Most importantly, protection 
from HIV/AIDS demands sacrifices in the form of behavior changes within the 
(very) private sphere that are often costly. Since the disease differs in these 
regards, the combating of it demands a different approach compared to, for 
example, the combating of Malaria and Tuberculosis. In the next section, we 
further develop this argument. 
The argument  
Sexual behavior change is generally put forward as a crucial component for 
preventing the spread of HIV, and understanding changes in behavior is thus 
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important for designing appropriate policy responses to the epidemic (Oster 
2007). Yet, previous research points to limited changes in sexual behavior in 
many parts of Africa, which in fact is quite surprising given the behavioural 
responses among high risk groups such as gay men in for example the United 
States (Stoneburner and Low Beer 2004; Caldwell et al 1999; Winkelstein et al. 
1987; Francis 2005) How can we understand this? Why is it that people continue 
to engage in sexual behavior that could lead to a slow and painful premature 
death? In this project, we argue that the reason why people continue to dice with 
death by taking sexual health risks is that engaging in safe sex demands sacrifices 
on behalf of individuals. The long incubation period of AIDS implies that 
behavior changes often imply higher costs at least in the short term than getting 
infected by the disease (Oster 2007). The costs can be both material and non-
material in kind as they involve such things as condom use, partner reduction, 
interventions in the process of child birth, refraining from breast feeding, the 
testing of blood, and the monitoring of knowledge. More specifically, HIV/AIDS 
prevention demands individual sacrifice in the sense that it involves the 
acceptance of new information, including public sexual education campaigns 
and/or discussions about abstinence and partner reduction. As argued by 
Lieberman, such campaigns can be upsetting because they implicate members of 
society in the practice of sexual behavior that they often would prefer to remain 
completely private. AIDS policies have also involved the testing of the blood of 
citizens, and monitoring knowledge of the epidemic and sexual behavior which 
has often been viewed as a nuisance and/or potentially embarrassing and quite 
frightening (Lieberman 2007). In the process of childbirth, AIDS policies have 
included direct interventions such as mandatory blood tests, the placement of 
HIV-positive women on drug therapies, and the requirement that they deliver 
babies by caesarean-section in order to prevent viral transmission. AIDS policies 
have furthermore demanded that HIV-positive women refrain from breast-
feeding, which is a particularly significant sacrifice in societies where breast-
feeding is widely practiced and valued. Not to breast-feed in such societies is 
often understood as a public display of HIV-status (Lieberman 2007).  
Attempts to stop the spread of the disease have in addition involved demands 
for behaviour changes such as condom use, abstinence, and partner reduction 
(Oster 2005). These behaviour changes can potentially be costly in many different 
ways. For example, since women often depend economically on their husbands or 
boyfriends, it is often impossible for them to refuse sex or negotiate for condom 
use even if they know that their partner has had other sexual relationships 
(Patterson 2006, see also Walker et al. 2004). Furthermore, since motherhood is 
crucial for many women’s identity, women may also be less likely to request their 
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husband use condoms, since this protection prevents pregnancy. For the very 
same reason, marriage has in fact become an additional risk factor for contracting 
HIV in countries with high HIV prevalence levels (Patterson 2006, see also 
Baylies 2002). Additionally, since the welfare system is under-developed in most 
poor countries, children act as an economic as well as social insurance for the 
household. Consequently, the alternative cost for giving up children is rather high 
in most developing countries not only for personal reasons, but also for economic 
ones. 
While previous attempts to stop the disease has recognized some of the costs 
involved, they have focused more on the direct economic costs such as, for 
example, expenses for condoms and tests. Consequently they have commonly 
ignored other important costs involved such as taking in new information, and 
accepting the need for behavior changes and preventive care. Without such 
acceptance of intrusions into the private sphere, reducing the cost of condoms 
risks having only limited impact. In addition to the access to material resources, 
what is at stake if the spread of the pandemic is to be stopped is, in other words, 
that individuals in a first step perceive such intrusions into the private sphere to be 
legitimate. First when this is case, they will act upon the recommendations given 
by the state or other actors. Furthermore, we argue that it is reasonable to assume 
that the ability of the main actors involved in trying to stop the spread of 
HIV/AIDS to intrude into the private sphere and foster behavior conducive to the 
prevention of HIV/AIDS depends on the degree to which citizens perceive their 
recommendations and actions as legitimate. The more currency in terms of 
perceptions of legitimacy available to main actors, the stronger capacity they will 
have to prevent the spread of the disease. The overarching question hence 
becomes why main actors, such as the state, vary in terms of their legitimacy to 
intrude into the private sphere and induce behavior changes which, in turn, 
prevent the further spread of HIV/AIDS.  
With the point of departure in theories about how political institutions shape 
and constrain individual behavior, we argue that there is reason to believe that the 
varying abilities of states to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS depends on the 
design of institutions, through the intervening effects of individual perceptions of 
the legitimacy of the main actors involved and the acceptance of intrusions into 
the private sphere. At the most fundamental level, institutions can be understood 
as ‘the rules of the game’ (North 1990; Steinmo 2001a; Steinmo 2001b). As such, 
the organization of political institutions systematically structures actors’ 
preferences and behavior (March & Olsen 1984; March & Olsen 1989; Rothstein 
1996; Steinmo et al. 1992). Accordingly, they can, in the words of Hall, be 
understood as ”the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating 
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practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the 
polity and economy” (Hall 1986: 19). North provides a similar definition, viewing 
institutions as the “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” 
(North 1990: 3). Given the theoretical importance of institutions, we argue that 
future research within the field of HIV/AIDS would benefit from exploring and 
comparing the impact of different institutional designs on HIV/AIDS outcomes. 
An empirical investigation could for example compare the effects of government 
structures on HIV/AIDS outcomes, i.e. the effects of different ways to allocate 
power within the political system (centralized or decentralized). A centralized 
government structure refers to a political system in which power is concentrated 
in a central authority to which local governments are subject. A decentralized 
government structure is, on the other hand, broadly understood as a system in 
which the central government has formally ceded powers to actors and institutions 
at lower levels in a political, administrative, and territorial hierarchy (Ribot 2004: 
8). A decentralized system has furthermore been divided into four different 
categories: deconcentration, devolution, delegation, privatization (Crook & Manor 
1998; Ribot 2004). In this project, we add a fifth category of potential importance; 
decentralization to traditional groups. Deconcentration (administrative 
decentralization) refers to a process in which power is transferred to local 
branches of the central state such as prefects, administrators, or local technical 
line ministry agents. These upwardly accountable bodies are appointed 
administrative extensions of the central state. They may have some downward 
accountability built into their functions, but their primary obligations are to the 
central government. Deconcentration is considered to be among the weaker forms 
of decentralization since downward accountability is not as well-established as in 
other forms. Devolution broadly means the transfer of power to local governments 
that are accountable to and representative of local populations, typically elected 
local governments. By and large, devolution aims to increase public participation 
in local decision-making. As such, it is considered among the stronger forms of 
decentralization since downward accountability is generally more well-established 
compared to in other forms. Through delegation central governments transfer 
responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-
autonomous branches not wholly controlled by the central government, but 
ultimately accountable to it. Governments delegate responsibilities when they 
create public enterprises or corporations, housing authorities, transportation 
authorities, special service districts, semi-autonomous school districts, regional 
development corporations, or special project implementation units. Usually these 
organizations have a great deal of discretion in decision-making. In addition, they 
may be exempt from constraints on regular civil service personnel and may be 
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able to charge users directly for services. Privatization means the transfer of 
power to any, non-traditional and non-ethnic, non-state entity, including a number 
of different forms of private-public partnerships. However, even though 
privatization is often carried out in the name of decentralization, it is often not 
perceived as a pure form of decentralization since it operates on an exclusive logic 
rather than on the inclusive public logic of decentralization. Finally, by 
decentralization to traditional groups means the transfer of power to traditional 
authorities.  
The idea that government structures in the form of centralization and 
decentralization could potentially have important effects on development 
outcomes in general and health outcomes in particular is not very controversial. 
On the contrary, in the last two decades, health sector decentralization policies 
have been implemented on a broad scale throughout the developing world 
(Bossert & Beauvais 2002; Litvack et al. 1998). The process has largely been 
driven by international donors and has been argued to promote an enabling 
environment for, among other things, the health sector by improving allocative 
efficiency; by allowing the mix of services and expenditures to be shaped by local 
user preferences; improving technical efficiency through greater cost 
consciousness at the local level; facilitating service delivery innovation through 
experimentation and adaptation to local conditions; improving quality, 
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy owing to user oversight and 
participation in decision-making; and greater equity through distribution of 
resources toward traditionally marginal regions and groups (Sida 2002; Bardhan 
2005; Bossert & Beauvais 2002; World Bank 1993; World Bank 2004; Pritchett 
and Woolcock 2004; Besley & Ghatak 2007). Yet, despite the fact that health 
sector decentralization policies have been implemented on a broad scale 
throughout the developing world over the last decades, few systematic 
comparisons have been conducted that evaluate the impact of decentralization on 
health outcomes in general, and on the spread of HIV/AIDS in particular. The few 
studies that have been conducted have most commonly been single case studies 
and have not explored the impact of different types of decentralization. As such, 
what is still lacking in the literature is, on the one hand, a deeper understanding of 
how decentralization policies overall perform in comparison to non-decentralized 
systems and, on the other, how different types and aspects of decentralization 
policies affect health outcomes. While traditional authorities still have a lot of at 
least non-institutionalized influence in many African societies, this group of 
power-holders has often been dismissed in the earlier literature on the relationship 
between decentralization and health outcomes. 
 13
In the end, as illustrated in Figure 1, according to the tenets of institutional 
theory, depending on how government structures are organized, it is reasonable to 
believe that they will induce different types of individual behavior, ultimately 
leading to varying HIV/AIDS outcomes. If individuals do not perceive the 
government structures which provide preventive care and information about how 
to prevent HIV/AIDS as legitimate, they will not be willing to change their 
behavior. 
 
Figure 1. The analytical model 
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A tentative research design 
In order to test the argument developed above, we argue that a suitable design 
would be to select cases that vary with respect to the dependent variable, i.e. 
HIV/AIDS outcome. With respect to the different cases, the relationship between 
government structures (as ultimately specified in legislation and key policy 
documents) and the dependent variable, i.e. HIV/AIDS prevalence could then be 
explored. Uganda, South Africa, Botswana and Senegal would for example be of 
interest to investigate in a comparative framework. Uganda and Senegal are 
generally put forward as success cases in terms of the effective combating of 
HIV/AIDS. Senegal is arguably the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that has 
prevented a generalized HIV/AIDS epidemic, its adult prevalence never rising 
much above 1 percent. Uganda’s situation has been different, but is still generally 
put forward as a success case. When Uganda’s AIDS Control Programme 
formulated a five year plan with WHO assistance in 1987, it faced the worst HIV 
epidemic in the world, with a 24 percent adult prevalence. In the early 1990s, the 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate had already decreased to 13 percent, and in 2003 it 
was down to 4.1 (Iliffe 2006). Botswana and South Africa, on the other hand, are 
two of the countries with the highest prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS in sub-
Saharan Africa. In fact, Botswana rates as number one in the world as the country 
with the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS. More than one third of the population 
is infected. 
A second step to further test the argument above would be to investigate the 
sources of variation in HIV/AIDS prevalence between different regions within 
more and less successful countries. Are there any less successful regions within 
the more successful countries, and are there any successful regions within the less 
successful countries? And if this is the case, can the different rates of success be 
explained by differences in the government structures affecting these particular 
regions?  
Taken together, a design like the one suggested above would provide valuable 
theoretical and empirical knowledge concerning the relationship between varying 
forms of government structures and HIV/AIDS outcomes. Are certain structures 
perceived to be more legitimate than others? That is, do they vary in terms of their 
effectiveness in inducing the behavior changes necessary to stop the spread of 
HIV/AIDS?  
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Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we have argued that while previous research has provided a large 
number of important insights about how to hamper the spread of HIV/AIDS, they 
have commonly overlooked the fact that HIV/AIDS is in many ways different 
from other diseases in the sense that the prevention of it demands intrusions into 
the (very) private sphere and demands a large number of sacrifices on behalf of 
individuals. More specifically, we argue that while previous research has 
recognized some of the more direct costs involved in the prevention of the 
disease, they have commonly ignored sacrifices associated with the acceptance of 
intrusions into the private sphere such as taking in new information and accepting 
the need for behavior changes and preventive care. First after individuals perceive 
such intrusions as legitimate, they will act upon the recommendations given by 
the state and other main actors. The degree to which individuals perceive 
information and preventive care as legitimate and is in turn argued to depend on 
the organization of government structures. As political institutions, government 
structures have the potential to shape and constrain individual behavior. However, 
our empirical knowledge concerning the impact of institutional arrangements on 
HIV/AIDS outcomes up to today remains rather limited.     
By exploring the impact of the design of government structures on the spread 
of HIV/AIDS, the suggested research design has the potential to contribute a 
deeper empirical understanding of how we can stop one of the biggest threats to 
human well-being, as well as to social and economic development, in human 
history. Furthermore, from a social scientific perspective, the suggested research 
design has the potential to contribute to an increased knowledge about the 
political sources of variation in the spread of HIV/AIDS. While during the past 
decades decentralization policies have been implemented on a broad scale 
throughout the developing world, there is still only limited knowledge concerning 
whether such policies are more conducive than policies of centralization when it 
comes to inducing behavior change. Moreover, we still lack knowledge about 
whether different types of decentralization have the same effects on social and 
political development. The suggested research design in addition offers a new way 
to theoretically think about the problem of HIV/AIDS by focusing on the behavior 
change necessary for preventing the spread of the disease. By recognizing the 
costs involved in behavior change, the project distinguishes itself from previous 
social science research which has, by and large, assumed that people lack 
information or are ignorant. That is, we argue that the reason why people do not 
change their behavior is that they do not perceive the messenger as a legitimate 
actor. In the end, for people to change their behavior, the perceived long-term 
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benefits of engaging in safe sex must be larger than the perceived short-term 
benefits of not doing so. 
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